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Abstract
Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of smart
grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. This paper studies the
complex-demand knapsack problem, in which the demands are complex valued and the capacity of sup-
plies is described by the magnitude of total complex-valued demand. This naturally captures the power
constraints in alternating current (AC) electric systems. In this paper, we provide a more complete study
and generalize the problem to the multi-minded version, beyond the previously known 12 -approximation
algorithm for only a subclass of the problem. More precisely, we give a truthful PTAS for the case
φ ∈ [0, pi2 − δ], and a truthful FPTAS, which fully optimizes the objective function but violates the ca-
pacity constraint by at most (1 + ), for the case φ ∈ (pi2 , pi − δ], where φ is the maximum argument of
any complex-valued demand and , δ > 0 are arbitrarily small constants. We complement these results
by showing that, unless P=NP, neither a PTAS for the case φ ∈ (pi2 , pi − δ] nor any bi-criteria approxima-
tion algorithm with polynomial guarantees for the case when φ is arbitrarily close to pi (that is, when δ is
arbitrarily close to 0) can exist.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, many practical auction problems are combinatorial in nature, requiring carefully designed time-
efficient approximation algorithms. Although there have been decades of research in approximating combi-
natorial auction problems, traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints.
Namely, the demands for certain goods are limited by the respective supplies, described by certain linear
constraints.
Recently, the rise of smart grid presents a new class of auction problems. In alternating current (AC) elec-
tric systems [10], the power is determined by time-varying voltage and current, which gives rise to two types
of power demands: (1) active power (that can be consumed by resistors at the loads) and, (2) reactive power
∗This paper appears in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 5, No. 1, Article 7, October, 2016. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2955089 Extended abstracts containing some of the results have been presented in the International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2014) [5] and a workshop at the International Conference on
Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN 2014) [16].
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(that continuously bounces back and forth between the power sources and loads). The combination of active
power and reactive power is known as apparent power. The ratio between active power and apparent power
is known as power factor. In practice, the physical capacity of power generation and transmission is often
expressed by apparent power. Electric appliances and instruments with capacitive or inductive components
have non-zero reactive power. However, most electric appliances and instruments are subject to regulations
to limit their power factors [1]. It is vital to ensure that the total power usage is within the apparent power
constraint, given the maximum power factor of power demands.
In the common literature of electric power systems [10], apparent power is represented by a complex
number, wherein the real part represents the active power and the imaginary part represents the reactive
power. Hence, it is often necessary to use a quadratic constraint, namely the magnitude of complex numbers,
to describe the system capacity. The power factor is related to the phase angle between active power and
reactive power. Yu and Chau [25] introduced the complex-demand knapsack problem (CKP) to model a one-
shot auction for combinatorial AC electric power allocation, which is a quadratic programming variant of the
classical knapsack problem.
Furthermore, future smart grids will be automated by agents representing individual users. Hence, one
might expect these agents to be self-interested and may untruthfully report their valuations or demands. This
motivates us to consider truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approximation mechanisms, in which it is in the
best interest of the agents to report their true parameters. In [25] a monotone 12 -approximation algorithm that
induces a deterministic truthful mechanism was devised for the complex-demand knapsack problem, which,
however, assumes that all complex-valued demands lie in the positive quadrant.
In this paper, we provide a complete study and generalize the complex-demand knapsack problem to the
multi-minded version, beyond the previously known 12 -approximation algorithm. More precisely, we consider
the problem under the framework of (bi-criteria) (α, β)-approximation algorithms, which compute a feasible
solution with objective function within a factor of α of optimal, but may violate the capacity constraint by a
factor of at most β. We give a (deterministic) truthful (1 − , 1)-approximation algorithm for the case φ ∈
[0, pi2−δ], and a truthful (1, 1+)-approximation for the case φ ∈ (pi2 , pi−δ], where φ is the maximum argument
of any complex-valued demand and , δ > 0 are arbitrarily small constants. Moreover, the running time in
the latter case is polynomial in n and 1 (this may be thought of as an FPTAS with resource augmentation;
see, e.g., [11, 23]). We complement these results by showing that, unless P=NP, neither a PTAS can exist
for the latter case nor any bi-criteria approximation algorithm with exponential guarantees for the case when
φ is arbitrarily close to pi. Note that the difficulty when φ ∈ (pi2 , pi] is mainly due to the fact that demands
are allowed to have both positive and negative real parts, which can cancel each other; this allows an optimal
solution to pack much larger set of demands, within the available capacity, than any polynomial time algorithm
can detect. We remark also that [24, 25] show no FPTAS exists for the case φ ∈ [0, pi2 − δ]. Therefore, our
results completely settle the open questions in [25].
1.1 Contribution
In Table 1, we briefly list the inapproximability and the best known truthful mechanisms for them-dimensional
knapsack problem (mDKP), m ≥ 2, along with our results for three classes of CKP (namely, demands with
maximum argument φ ∈ [0, pi2 ], φ ∈ [0, pi − δ], and φ ≥ pi − δ′ where δ is polynomially small in n, while δ′
is exponentially small n).
2 Related Work
Linear combinatorial auctions can be formulated as variants of the classical knapsack problem [6, 9, 14].
Notably, these include the one-dimensional knapsack problem (1DKP) where a single item has multiple
copies, and its multi-dimensional generalization, the m-dimensional knapsack problem (mDKP). There is an
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CKP[0, pi
2
] CKP[pi
2
+ δ, pi-δ] CKP[pi-δ′, pi] mDKP
Inapproximability No FPTAS [24, 25]
No
(α, 1)-approx
(Sec. 4)
Bi-criteria In-
approximable
(Sec. 4)
No FPTAS
(see, e.g., [14])
Truthful Mechanism
PTAS (Sec. 5.3)
(1, 1 + )-FPTAS
(Sec. 6)
(1, 1 + )-FPTAS
(Sec. 6)
None
PTAS [8]
Bi-criteria
FPTAS [18]
Table 1: A summary of results
FPTAS for 1DKP (see, e.g., [14]).
In mechanism design setting, where each customer may untruthfully report her valuation and demand, it
is desirable to design truthful or incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms, in which it is in the best
interest of each customer to reveal her true valuation and demand [7]. In the so-called single-minded case, a
monotone procedure can guarantee incentive compatibility [21]. While the straightforward FPTAS for 1DKP
is not monotone, since the scaling factor involves the maximum item value, [4] gave a monotone FPTAS,
by performing the same procedure with a series of different scaling factors irrelevant to the item values and
taking the best solution out of them. Hence, 1DKP admits a truthful FPTAS. We remark that monotonicity
may be not enough for the incentive compatibility in the general setting. More recently, a truthful PTAS,
based on another approach using dynamic programming and the notion of the maximal-in-range mechanism,
was given in [8] for the multi-minded case. We will use the maximal-in-range approach in this paper.
As for mDKP with m ≥ 2, a PTAS is given in [9] based on the integer programming formulation, but
it is not evident to see whether it is monotone. On the other hand, 2DKP is already inapproximable by
an FPTAS unless P = NP, by a reduction from EQUIPARTITION [14]. Very recently, [18] gave a truthful
FPTAS with (1 + )-violation for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a constant number of distinct goods
(including mDKP), and its generalization to the multi-minded version, when m is fixed. Their technique is
based on applying the VCG-mechanism to a rounded problem. Based on the PTAS for the m-minded multi-
unit auctions developed in [8], they also obtained a truthful PTAS for m-minded multi-unit combinatorial
auctions with a constant number of distinct goods. Intuitively, a valuation function is m-minded if it is
completely determined by the values on m different choices; for simplicity we call this type of valuation
multi-minded in the rest of the paper.
In contrast, truthful non-linear combinatorial auctions were explored to a little extent. Yu and Chau
[25] introduced the complex-demand knapsack problem, which models auctions with a convex quadratic
constraint. An earlier paper [24] also introduced the same problem without considering truthfulness by a
different name called 2-weighted knapsack problem. One can regard, the complex-demand knapsack problem
with strategic considerations as an auction design problem, where users bid on complex-valued items, and
a feasible solution allocates one item to each user such that the total magnitude of allocated items is below
a certain threshold. Even though some of the existing techniques can deal with combinatorial auctions with
convex non-linear relaxations (see, e.g., [19]), those techniques require bounded integrality gap and yield
randomized truthful-in-expectations mechanisms.
3 Problem Definitions and Notations
In this section we formally define the complex-demand knapsack problem. We present first the non-strategic
version of the problem where we assume all parameters are known beforehand. Then we describe the strategic
version where each user k declares his/her valuation function defined over a set of declared demands. In the
latter setting, we consider the case where users could lie about their valuation functions and demand sets in
order to optimize their utility functions (see Sec. 3.5 for a formal definition of utility). Towards the end of
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this section, we present an application of the complex-demand knapsck problem to power allocation in (AC)
alternating current electric systems.
3.1 Complex-demand Knapsack Problem (non-strategic version)
We adopt the notations from [25]. Our study concerns power allocation under a capacity constraint on the
magnitude of the total satisfiable demand (i.e., apparent power). Throughout this paper, we sometimes denote
νR , Re(ν) as the real part and νI , Im(ν) as the imaginary part of a given complex number ν. We also
interchangeably denote a complex number by a 2D-vector as well as a point in the complex plane. |ν| denotes
the magnitude of ν.
We define the non-strategic version of the complex-demand knapsack problem (CKP) with a set [n] ,
{1, . . . , n} of users as follows:
(CKP) max
x∈{0,1}n
∑
k∈[n]
vkxk (1)
subject to
∣∣∣ ∑
k∈N
dkxk
∣∣∣ ≤ C. (2)
where dk = dRk + id
I
k ∈ C is the complex-valued demand of power for the k-th user, C ∈ R+ is a real-valued
capacity of total satisfiable demand in apparent power, and vk ∈ R+ is the valuation of user k if her demand dk
is satisfied (i.e., xk = 1). Evidently, CKP is also NP-complete, because the classical 1-dimensional knapsack
problem (1DKP) is a special case.
We define a class of sub-problems for CKP, by restricting the maximum phase angle (i.e., the argument)
of any demand. In particular, we will write CKP[φ1, φ2] for the restriction of problem CKP subject to
φ1 ≤ maxk∈N arg(dk) ≤ φ2, where arg(dk) ∈ [0, pi]. We remark that in the realistic settings of power
systems, the active power demand is positive (i.e., dRk ≥ 0), but the power factor (defined by
dRk
|dk| ) is bounded
by a certain threshold, which is equivalent to restricting the argument of complex-valued demands.
From the computational point of view, we will need to specify how the inputs are described. Through-
out the paper we will assume that each of the demands is given by their real and imaginary components,
represented as rational numbers.
3.2 Non-single-minded Complex Knapsack Problem (strategic version)
In this paper, we extend the single-minded CKP to general non-single-minded version, and then we apply
the well-known VCG-mechanism, or equivalently the framework of maximal-in-range mechanisms [22]. The
non-single-minded version is defined as follows. By a slight abuse of notation, we denote vk(·) as a valuation
function for the non-single-minded setting. As above we assume a set N of n users: user k has a valuation
function vk(·) : D → R+ over a (possibly infinite) set of demandsD ⊆ C. We assume that 0 ∈ D, vk(0) = 0
for all k ∈ N , and w.l.o.g., |d| ≤ C for all d ∈ D. We further assume that each vk(·) is monotone with respect
to a partial order “” defined on the elements of C as follows: for d, f ∈ C, d  f if and only if
|dR| ≥ |fR|, |dI| ≥ |f I|, sgn(dR) = sgn(fR), sgn(dI) = sgn(f I).
(See Fig. 1 for pictorial illustration.) We assume 0  d for all d ∈ D. Then for all k ∈ N , the monotonicity
of vk(·) means that vk(d) ≥ vk(f) whenever d  f .
The non-single-minded problem can be described by the following program (in the variables dk):
(NSMCKP) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (3)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈N
dk
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C (4)
dk ∈ D for all k ∈ N , (5)
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Figure 1: A pictorial illustration for the partial order “”: d1  d2 and d4  d3.
where |∑k∈N dk| = √(∑k∈N dRk )2 + (∑k∈N dIk)2. Of particular interest is the multi-minded version of
the problem (MULTICKP), defined as follows. Each user k ∈ N is interested only in a polynomial-size subset
of demandsDk ⊆ D and declares her valuation only over this set (that is, Dk is a set of 2-dimensional vectors
of size |Dk| = poly(n)). Note that the multi-minded problem can be modeled in the form (NSMCKP) by
assuming w.l.o.g. that 0 ∈ Dk, for each user k ∈ N , and defining the valuation function vk(·) : D → R+ as
follows:
vk(d) = max
dk∈Dk
{vk(dk) : dk  d}. (6)
We shall assume that the demand set of each user lies completely in one of the quadrants, namely, either
dR ≥ 0 for all d ∈ Dk, or dR < 0 for all d ∈ Dk. This assumption is needed for the results in Sec. 6, as we
will see, the problem is split into two independent 2-DKP problems based on the demands’ quadrants, then
each user k is allocated by one demand in the quadrant where all her demands Dk lie. (As we will see in
Sec. 3.6, dR ≥ 0 corresponds to an inductive load, while dI corresponds to a capacitive load.) Note that the
single-minded version (which is CKP) is special case, where |Dk| = 1 for all k. When we consider strategic
users, we will assume that the users can lie about their demand sets and/or valuation functions (as long as the
demand set of each user lies completely in one of the quadrants).
We will write MULTICKP[φ1, φ2] for the restriction of the problem subject to φ1 ≤ φ ≤ φ2 for all d ∈ D
where φ , maxd∈D arg(d) (and as before we assume arg(d) ≥ 0).
3.3 Non-single-minded Multidimensional Knapsack Problem
To design truthful mechanisms for NSMCKP, it will be useful to consider the non-single-minded multidimen-
sional knapsack problem1 (NSM-mDKP) defined as follows, where we assume more generally that D ⊆ Rm+
and a capacity vector c ∈ Rm+ is given. As before, a valuation function for each user k is given by (6). An
allocation is given by an assignment of a demand dk = (d1k, ..., d
m
k ) ∈ D for each user k, so as to satisfy them-
dimensional capacity constraint
∑
k∈N dk ≤ c. The objective is to find an allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn
so as to maximize the sum of the valuations
∑
k∈N vk(dk). The problem can be described by the following
program:
(NSM-mDKP) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (7)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
dk ≤ c (8)
dk ∈ D for all k ∈ N . (9)
1Sometimes, this is also called the multiple-choice knapsack problem.
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Similarly, we consider the multi-minded version of the problem (MULTI-mDKP): each user k ∈ N is
interested only in a polynomial-size subset of demands Dk ⊆ D and declares her valuation only over this set.
The multi-minded problem can be modeled in the form NSM-mDKP by assuming w.l.o.g. that 0 ∈ Dk, for
each user k ∈ N , and defining the valuation function vk(·) : D → R+ as vk(d) = maxdk∈Dk{vk(dk) : dk 
d}, where “” is a component-wise partial order.
It is worth noting that NSM-mDKP is similar to multi-unit combinatorial auctions (CA) with m distinct
goods; the difference is that in the latter problem the set D is restricted to be integral, whereas we do not
assume this restriction in NSM-mDKP.
3.4 Approximation Algorithms
We present an explicit definition of approximation algorithms for our problem. A feasible allocation satisfying
(4) is represented by a vector d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn. When no demand is allocated to user k, we assume
dk = 0. We write v(d) ,
∑
k∈N vk(dk). Let d
∗ be an optimal allocation of NSMCKP (or MULTICKP)
and OPT , v(d∗) be the corresponding total valuation. We are interested in polynomial time algorithms
that output an allocation that is within a factor α of the optimum total valuation, but may violate the capacity
constraint by at most a factor of β:
Definition 3.1. For α ∈ (0, 1] and β ≥ 1, a bi-criteria (α, β)-approximation to NSMCKP is an allocation
(dk)k ∈ Dn satisfying ∣∣∣ ∑
k∈N
dk
∣∣∣ ≤ β · C (10)
such that
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) ≥ α · OPT. (11)
Similarly we define an (α, β)-approximation to MULTICKP.
In particular, a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) is a (1−, 1)-approximation algorithm for
any  > 0. The running time of a PTAS is polynomial in the input size for every fixed , but the exponent of
the polynomial may depend on 1/. An even stronger notion is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
(FPTAS), which requires the running time to be polynomial in both input size and 1/. In this paper, we are
interested in an FPTAS in the resource augmentation model, which is a (1, 1 + )-approximation algorithm
for any  > 0, with the running time being polynomial in the input size and 1/. We will refer to this as a
(1, 1 + )-FPTAS.
3.5 Truthful Mechanisms
This section follows the terminology of [21]. We define truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approximation
mechanisms for our problem. We denote byX ⊆ Dn the set of feasible allocations in our problem (NSMCKP
or MULTI-mDKP).
Definition 3.2 (Mechanisms). Let V , V1×· · ·×Vn, where Vk is the set of all possible valuations of agent k.
A mechanism (A,P) is defined by an allocation ruleA : V → X and a payment ruleP : V → Rn+. We assume
that the utility of player k, under the mechanism, when it receives the vector of bids v , (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V , is
defined as Uk(v) , v¯k(dk(v)) − pk(v), where A(v) = (d1(v), . . . , dn(v)), and P(v) = (p1(v), . . . , pn(v))
and v¯k denotes the true valuation of player k.
Namely, a mechanism defines an allocation rule and payment scheme, and the utility of a player is defined
as the difference between her valuation over her allocated demand and her payment.
6
Definition 3.3 (Truthful Mechanisms). A mechanism is said to be truthful if for all k and all vk ∈ Vk, and
v−k ∈ V−k, it guarantees that Uk(v¯k, v−k) ≥ Uk(vk, v−k).
Namely, the utility of any player is maximized, when she reports the true valuation.
Definition 3.4 (Social Efficiency). A mechanism is said to be α-socially efficient if for any v ∈ V , it returns an
allocation d ∈ X such that the total valuation (also called social welfare) obtained is at least an α-fraction
of the optimum: v(d) ≥ α · OPT.
As in [8, 18, 22], our truthful mechanisms are based on using VCG payments with Maximal-in-Range
(MIR) allocation rules:
Definition 3.5 (MIR). An allocation ruleA : V → X is an MIR, if there is a rangeR ⊆ X , such that for any
v ∈ V , A(v) ∈ argmaxd∈R v(d).
Namely,A is an MIR if it maximizes the social welfare over a fixed (declaration-independent) rangeR of
feasible allocations. It is well-known (and also easy to prove by a VCG-based argument) that an MIR, com-
bined with VCG payments (computed with respect to rangeR), yields a truthful mechanism. If, additionally,
the rangeR satisfies: maxd∈R v(d) ≥ α ·maxd∈X v(d), then such a mechanism is also α–socially efficient.
Finally a mechanism is computationally efficient if it can be implemented in polynomial time (in the size
of the input).
3.6 Application to Power Allocation in Alternating Current Electric Systems
Conventionally, the demands in (AC) alternating current electric systems are represented by active power in
positive real numbers and reactive power in (positive or negative) imaginary real numbers, which are complex
numbers in the first and fourth quadrants of the complex plane. We note that our problem is invariant, when
the arguments of all demands are shifted by the same angle. For convenience of notation, we assume the
demands are rotated by 90 degrees unless all demands are entirely in the first quadrant of the complex plane2.
See Fig. 2 for a pictorial illustration. Notice that the axis labels are swapped after the rotation, the real axis
indicates the reactive power while the imaginary indicates the active power.
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Figure 2: Each vector represents a power demand d. The figure shows that all demands are rotated by 90◦.
CKP is a simplified model of the real-world AC electric systems, which considers the capacity constraint
of a single link (e.g., a single bottleneck). There are practical scenarios, where the single-link capacity con-
straint is critical. For example, in a microgrid, there is usually a single transmission line connecting the main
2 Note that it is customary in the power engineering literature to assume that the demands lie in the first and fourth quadrants of
the complex plane. However, for convenience of presentation, we prefer to work in the first and second quadrants. For instance, if
all the demands are capacitive (i.e., lie in the fourth quadrant), then rotation by 90 degrees allows us to assume that the all numbers
involved are non-negative, a property which is necessary for obtaining a PTAS.
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grid and the microgrid. In such a setting, our model can capture power allocation considering the capacity of
transmission bottleneck. We also remark that our single-link model is fundamental to general network setting
with multiple capacitated links. A thorough understanding of the single-link case can pave the way to solv-
ing the multi-link case. As a follow-up study, our recent paper [15] considers non-strategic power allocation
of power flow of inelastic demands in a power network, which is based on some of the fundamental results
obtained in this paper.
In the conventional models of AC electric systems, there are multiple operating constraints, in addition to
capacity constraint. One example is the nodal voltage constraint at customers. In our recent study of event-
based demand response management in microgrids [13], we evaluate the changes of nodal voltage in response
to power allocation decisions of customers. We observe that the voltage is less sensitive to the decisions of
power allocation. Hence, CKP is a suitable model for approximating the power allocation in such a setting.
We remark that the simplified DistFlow model [2, 3, 20] is a well-known approximation model of power
flows by ignoring the loss terms from the formulation. In fact, CKP is equivalent to the simplified DistFlow
model on a capacitated single link topology.
Naturally, MULTICKP models combinatorial power auctions in AC electric systems. Each customer k
declares to the utility company a set of demands Dk that represents her preferences among different alter-
natives of load profiles, and a valuation function vk over Dk. The valuation vk(d) represents the amount
customer k is welling to pay if her load profile d ∈ Dk is satisfied. If customer k wants to bid for a load
that represents multiple appliances at once, she can include her corresponding vector sum to the set Dk as an
additional preference. The monotonicity of vk with respect to the partial order “” implies the free disposal
of extra supplied power (see Fig. 1). Larger active power (imaginary component) should have at least the
value of smaller active power. Conventionally, capacitive loads have negative reactive power, while inductive
loads have positive reactive power. Monotonicity implies that extra supplied reactive power of the same type
(capacitive or inductive) should have at least the same valuation. Indeed, customers can define constant valu-
ation for different values of reactive power. We remark that all demands in the setDk are assumed to be either
in the first quadrant or the second, but not in both. This in fact implies the load profiles of each customer
are either only capacitive, or only inductive. Such mild assumption is actually needed in order to apply the
(1, 1 + )-FPTAS in Sec. 6.
4 Hardness of Power Allocation in AC Electric Systems
In this section, we present our main hardness result for CKP, which depends on the maximum angle φ the
demands make with the positive real axis. When φ ∈ [pi2 + δ, pi], we show that the problem is inapproximable
within any polynomial factor if we do not allow a violation of Constraint (2). Moreover, when φ approaches
pi, there is no (α, β)-approximation, for any α and β with polynomial bit length. Our hardness results indicate
that the approximability of the problem CKP differs depending on maximum argument of any demand φ.
This insight suggests to study different techniques in the later sections to achieve the best approximation
result possible for each case.
Theorem 4.1. Unless P=NP, for any δ > 0 and δ′ > 0
(i) there is no (α, 1)-approximation for CKP[pi2 + δ, pi] where α, δ have polynomial length.
(ii) there is no (α, β)-approximation for CKP[pi − δ′, pi], where α and β have polynomial length, and δ′ is
exponentially small in n.
Remark. In fact, these hardness results hold even if we assume that all demands are on the real line,
except one demand dm+1 such that arg(dm+1) = pi2 + θ, for some θ ∈ [δ, pi2 ] (see Fig. 3). Note that the trivial
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approximation of picking the user with the highest feasible value does not obtain 1n approximation, because
we allow demands to have both positive and negative real parts, which can cancel each other.
Figure 3: The set of demands {dk} for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. We present a reduction from the (weakly) NP-hard subset sum problem (SUBSUM): given an instance
I , a set of positive integers A , {a1, . . . , am} and a positive integer B, does there exist a subset of A that
sums-up to exactly B? We assume that B is not polynomial in m, otherwise the problem can be easily solved
in polynomial time by dynamic programming.
We construct an instance I ′ of CKP[pi2 +θ,
pi
2 +θ] for each instance I of SUBSUM such that if SUBSUM(I)
is a “yes” instance then the optimum value of CKP[pi2 + θ,
pi
2 + θ], denoted by OPT, is at least 1; and if
SUBSUM(I) is a “no” instance, then OPT < α even when Cons. (2) can be violated by β.
We define n , m + 1 demands: for each ak, k = 1, ...,m, define a demand dk , ak, and an additional
demand
dm+1 , −B + iB cot θ.
For all k = 1, ...,m, let valuation vk , αm+1 , and vm+1 , 1. We let
C , B cot θ.
We prove the first direction, assuming SUBSUM(I) is feasible. Namely,
∑m
k=1 akxˆk = B, where xˆ ∈
{0, 1}m is a solution vector of SUBSUM. Construct a solution x ∈ {0, 1}m+1 of CKP such that
xk =
{
xˆk if k = 1, ...,m
1 if k = m+ 1.
In fact, this is a feasible solution that satisfies Constraint (2): using
∑m
k=1 akxˆk −B = 0, we get(
m∑
k=1
dRk xk + d
R
m+1
)2
+
(
m∑
k=1
dIkxk + d
I
m+1
)2
=
(
m∑
k=1
dRk xk −B
)2
+B2 cot2 θ
= B2 cot2 θ = C2.
Since vm+1 = 1, the total value of such solution v(x) ≥ 1, which implies that OPT is at least 1.
Conversely, assume that OPT ≥ α. Let x∗ ∈ {0, 1}m+1 be an optimal solution that may violate Cons. (2)
by β. Since user m + 1 has valuation vm+1 = 1, while the rest of users valuations total to less than α:
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∑m
k=1 vk < α, user m+ 1 must be included in the optimum. Therefore, substituting in Constraint (10),(
m∑
k=1
dRk x
∗
k −B
)2
+B2 cot2 θ ≤ β2C2
gives (
m∑
k=1
akx
∗
k −B
)2
≤ β2C2 −B2 cot2 θ
= B2 cot2 θ(β2 − 1). (12)
By the integrality of the ai’s,
m∑
k=1
akx
∗
k = B ⇐⇒ |
m∑
k=1
akx
∗
k −B| < 1 (13)
In other words, SUBSUM is feasible if and only if the absolute difference |∑mk=1 akx∗k−B| < 1. This implies,
SUBSUM(I) is feasible when the R.H.S. of Eqn. (12) is strictly less than 1. When β = 1, R.H.S. of Eqn. (12)
is zero, and we complete the second direction and hence, the proof of part (i) of the theorem.
For large enough θ, the R.H.S. of Eqn. (12) is strictly less than 1:
B2 cot2 θ(β2 − 1) < 1
This implies, θ > tan−1
√
B2(β2 − 1). By Eqn. (13), SUBSUM is feasible which completes the second
direction and establishes part (ii) of the theorem.
5 A Truthful PTAS for MULTICKP[0, pi2 − δ]
In this section, we present our truthful PTAS for MULTICKP[0, pi2 − δ]. This PTAS invokes a truthful PTAS
for MULTI-mDKP as a subroutine. Problem MULTI-mDKP was shown in [18] to have a (1 − )-socially
efficient truthful PTAS in the setting of multi-unit auctions with a few distinct goods, based on generalizing the
result for the case m = 1 in [8]. We explain this result first in our setting, and then use it in Sections 5.2 and
5.3 to derive a truthful PTAS for MULTICKP[0, pi2 −δ]. We remark that, without the truthfulness requirement,
our PTAS works even for δ = 0. However, we are only able to make it truthful for any given, but arbitrarily
small, constant δ > 0. Removing this technical assumption is an interesting open question.
5.1 A Truthful PTAS for MULTI-mDKP
We present a truthful PTAS for MULTI-mDKP that will be needed in Sec. 5.2-5.3 below. This result is a
slight generalization of [18] to accommodate real-valued demand vectors instead of integer-valued.
Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) be the capacity vector, and for any d ∈ D ⊆ Rm+ , write dk = (d1k, . . . , dmk ). For any
subset of users N ⊆ N and a partial selection of demands d¯ = (dk ∈ D : k ∈ N), such that
∑
k∈N dk ≤ c,
define the vector bN,d¯ = (b
1
N,d¯
, . . . , bm
N,d¯
) ∈ Rm+ as follows
biN,d¯ =
ci −∑k∈N dik
(n− |N |)2 . (14)
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Following [8, 18, 22], we consider a restricted range of allocations defined as follows:
S ,
⋃
N⊆N , d¯=(dk: k∈N): |N|≤m ,
dk∈D ∀k∈N
SN,d¯, (15)
where, for a set N ⊆ N and a partial selection of demands d¯ = (d¯k ∈ D : k ∈ N),
SN,d¯ ,
{
(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn |
∑
k∈N
dk ≤ c, dk = d¯k ∀k ∈ N,
∀k 6∈ N ∀i ∈ [m] ∃rik ∈ Z+ s.t. dik = rik · biN,d¯ and
∑
k 6∈N
rik ≤ (n− |N |)2
}
.
Note that the range S does not depend on the declarations D1, . . . , Dn. The following two lemmas establish
that the range S is a good approximation of the set of all feasible allocations and that it can be optimized over
in polynomial time. The first lemma is essentially a generalization of a similar one for multi-unit auctions
in [8], with the simplifying difference that we do not insist here on demands to be integral. The second lemma
is also a generalization of a similar result in [8], which was stated for the multi-unit auctions with a few
distinct goods in [18]. For completeness, we give the proofs in the appendix.
Lemma 5.1 ( [8]). maxd∈S v(d) ≥ (1− )OPT.
Lemma 5.2 ( [8,18]). We can findd∗ ∈ argmaxd∈S v(d) using dynamic programming in time |
⋃
kDk|O(m/).
It follows that an allocation rule defined as an MIR over range S yields a (1− )-socially efficient truthful
mechanism for MULTI-mDKP.
5.2 A PTAS for MULTICKP[0, pi
2
]
We now apply the result in the previous section to the multi-minded complex-demand knapsack problem,
when all agents are restricted to report their demands in the positive quadrant. We begin first by presenting a
PTAS without strategic considerations; then it is shown in the next section how to use this PTAS within the
aforementioned framework of MIR’s to obtain a truthful mechanism.
Overview of Technique. As we will see in Sec. 6, it is possible to obtain a (1, 1 + )-approximation by
a reduction to the MULTI-2DKP problem. To get a better result without violating the constraint, we reduce
MULTICKP[0, pi2 ] instance to MULTI-mDKP. We note that although there is a PTAS for MULTI-mDKP with
constant m [9], such a PTAS cannot be directly applied to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ] by polygonizing the circular
feasible region for MULTICKP[0, pi2 ], because one can show that such an approximation ratio is at least a
constant factor. This is the case, for instance, if the optimal solution consists of a few large (in magnitude)
demands together with many small demands, and it is not clear at what level of accuracy we should polygonize
the region to be able to capture these small demands. To overcome this difficulty, we have to first guess the
large demands, then we construct a grid (or a lattice) on the remaining part of the circular region, defining a
polygonal region in which we try to pack the maximum-utility set of demands. The latter problem is easily
seen to be a special case of the MULTI-mDKP problem. The main challenge is to choose the granularity of
the grid small enough to well-approximate the optimal, but also large enough so that the number of sides of
the polygon, and hence m is a constant only depending on 1/.
In this section we assume that arg(d) ≤ pi2 , that is, dR ≥ 0 and dI ≥ 0 for all d ∈ D. Without loss of
generality, we assume  < 14 where
1
 ∈ Z+. For an integer i ∈ Z+, let L1(i) and L2(i), respectively, denote
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the sets of all vertical and all horizontal lines in the complex plane that are at (non-negative) distances, from
the real and imaginary axes, which are integer multiples of C
2i
, that is,
L1(j) , {x+ iy ∈ C | x = λC
2j
, λ ∈ Z+, y ∈ R},
L2(j) , {x+ iy ∈ C | y = λC
2j
, λ ∈ Z+, x ∈ R}.
Given a feasible set of vectors T ⊆ D to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ] (that is,
∣∣∑
d∈T d
∣∣ ≤ C), define dT ,∑d∈T d,
and let
wIT ,
√
C2 − Re(dT )2 − Im(dT ), wRT ,
√
C2 − Im(dT )2 − Re(dT ). (16)
Namely, wRT (resp. w
I
T ) is the horizontal (resp. vertical) distance between dT and the boundary of the con-
straint disk (see Fig. 4 for an illustration).
Let ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ) be the smallest integers such that
C
/
2ρ1(T ) ≤ w
R
T
4
and C
/
2ρ2(T ) ≤ w
I
T
4
.
The set of lines in L1(ρ1(T )) ∪ L2(ρ2(T )) define a grid on the feasible region at “vertical and horizontal
levels” ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ), respectively. We observe that if we increase dRT , then w
R
T decreases as well as the
real granularity of the grid, and hence ρ1(T ) becomes larger. Similar observation holds when we increase dIT
Let λ1(T ) and λ2(T ) be the largest integers such that
dRT ≥
λ1(T )C
2ρ1(T )
and dIT ≥
λ2(T )C
2ρ2(T )
,
and zT ∈ C be the intersection of the two lines corresponding to λ1(T ) and λ2(T ):
zT , {x+ iy ∈ C | x = λ1(T )C
2ρ1(T )
} ∩ {x+ iy ∈ C | y = λ2(T )C
2ρ2(T )
}.
Given zT , we define four points in the complex plane (ψ′
1
T , ψ
1
T , ψ
2
T , ψ
′2
T ) such that
ψ′1T =
(
0,
√
C2 − Re(zT )2
)
, ψ1T =
(
Re(zT ),
√
C2 − Re(zT )2
)
,
ψ′2T =
(√
C2 − Im(zT )2, 0
)
, ψ2T =
(√
C2 − Im(zT )2, Im(zT )
)
.
LetRT be the part of the feasible region dominating zT :
RT , {x+ iy ∈ C : |x+ iy| ≤ C, x ≥ Re(zT ), y ≥ Im(zT )},
and PT () be the set of intersection points3 between the grid lines inL1(ρ1(T ))∪L2(ρ2(T )) and the boundary
ofRT :
PT () , {z ∈ RT : |z| = C} ∩ (L1(ρ1(T )) ∪ L2(ρ2(T ))).
The convex hull of the set of points PT () ∪ {ψ′1T , ψ1T , ψ2T , ψ′2T ,0} defines a polygonized region, which we
denote by PT () and its size (number of sides) by mT () (see Fig. 4 for an illustration).
Lemma 5.3. mT () ≤ 18 + 3.
3For simplicity of presentation, we will ignore the issue of finite precision needed to represent intermediate calculations (such as
the square roots above, or the intersection points of the lines of the grid with the boundary of the circle).
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Proof. Let x be the horizontal distance from zT to the boundary of the circle (with center 0 and radius C).
Then, by the definition of ρ1(T ), C2ρ1(T )−1 >
wRT
4 , which implies that
wRT
C <
1
2ρ1(T )−3 . On the other hand, by
the definition of zT ,
x ≤ wRT +
C
2ρ1(T )
≤ wRT +
wRT
4
=
(
1 +

4
)
wRT .
It follows from the above inequalities that the number of vertical grid lines (at level ρ1(T )) between zT and
the boundary of the circle is at most
x
C/2ρ1(T )
+ 1 ≤ 2
ρ1(T )
(
1 + 4
)
wRT
C
+ 1 <
8
(
1 + 4
)

+ 1 <
9

.
Similarly, we can show that the number of horizontal grid lines between zT and the boundary of the circle is
at most 9 . Adding the three other points {ψ′1T , ψ′2T ,0} gives the claim.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4: We illustrate the regionRT by the shaded area and PT () by the black dots on the arc of the circle.
The zoomed area highlights that wRT (resp. w
I
T ) is defined by dT not zT .
Definition 5.4. Consider a subset of usersN ⊆ N and a feasible set T , {dk : k ∈ N} to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ].
We define an approximate problem (PGZT ) by polygonizing MULTICKP[0, pi2 ]:
(PGZT ) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
dk ∈ PT ()
dk = dk, ∀k ∈ N
dk ∈ D, ∀k ∈ N\N.
Given two complex numbers µ and ν, we denote the projection of µ on ν by Pjν(µ) , ν|ν|2 (µ
RνR +µIνI).
Given the convex hull PT (), we define a set of mT () vectors {σiT }, each of which is perpendicular to each
boundary edge of PT () and starting at the origin (see Fig. 5 for an illustration).
Definition 5.5. Consider a subset of usersN ⊆ N and a feasible set T , {dk : k ∈ N} to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ].
We define a MULTI-mDKP problem based on {σiT }:
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Figure 5: Each σiT is a vector (starting at the origin) perpendicular to each boundary edge of PT ().
(MULTI-mDKP{σiT }) max
∑
k∈N
vk(dk) (17)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
|PjσTi (dk)| ≤ |σ
i
T |, ∀i = 1, . . . ,mT () (18)
dk = dk, ∀k ∈ N (19)
dk ∈ D, ∀k ∈ N\N. (20)
One can see that MULTI-mDKP{σiT } is an instance of MULTI-mDKP (defined in Sec. 3.3) over the set of
users N\N , m = mT (), dik = |PjσTi (dk)|, and c
i = |σiT | −
∑
k∈N |PjσTi (dk)|.
Lemma 5.6. Given a feasible set T to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ], PGZT and MULTI-mDKP{σiT } are equivalent.
Lemma 5.6 follows straightforwardly from the convexity of the polygon PT ().
Our PTAS for MUTLICKP[0, pi2 ] is described in Algorithm MULTICKP-PTAS, which enumerates every
subset partial selection T of at most 1 demands, then finds a near optimal allocation for each polygonized
region PT () using the PTAS of MULTI-mDKP from Section 5.1, which we denote by MULTI-mDKP-
PTAS[·].
Algorithm 1 MULTICKP-PTAS({vk, Dk}k∈N , C, )
Require: Users’ multi-minded valuations {vk, Dk}k∈N ; capacity C; accuracy parameter 
Ensure: (1− 3)-allocation (d̂1, . . . , d̂n) to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ]
1: (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)← (0, . . . ,0)
2: for each subset N ⊆ N and each subset T = {dk ∈ Dk : k ∈ N} of size at most 1 s.t.
∣∣∑
d∈T d
∣∣ ≤ C
do
3: Set dT ←
∑
d∈T d, and define the corresponding vectors {σiT }
4: Obtain (d1, . . . , dn)← MULTI-mDKP-PTAS [MULTI-mDKP{σiT }] within accuracy 
5: if
∑
k vk(d̂k) <
∑
k vk(dk) then
6: (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)← (d1, . . . , dn)
7: end if
8: end for
9: return (d̂1, . . . , d̂n)
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Theorem 5.7. For any  > 0, Algorithm MULTICKP-PTAS finds a (1−3, 1)-approximation to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ].
The running time of the algorithm is |⋃kDk|O( 12 ).
Proof. First, the upper bound on the running time of Algorithm MULTICKP-PTAS is due to the fact that each
of the |⋃kDk|O( 1 ) iterations in line 2 requires invoking the PTAS of MULTI-mDKP, which in turn takes
|⋃kDk|O(m/) time, by Lemma 5.2, where m = O(1 ). Therefore the total running time is |⋃kDk|O(1/) ·
|⋃kDk|O(1/2) = |⋃kDk|O(1/2).
The algorithm outputs a feasible allocation by Lemma 5.6 and the construction of PT (). To prove the
approximation ratio, we show in Lemma 5.8 below that, for any optimal (or feasible) allocation (d∗1, . . . , d∗n),
we can construct another feasible allocation (d˜1, . . . , d˜n) such that
∑
k vk(d˜k) ≥ (1 − 2)
∑
k vk(d
∗
k) and
(d˜1, . . . , d˜n) is feasible to PGZT for some T of size at most 1 . By Lemma 5.6, invoking the PTAS of MULTI-
mDKP{σiT } gives a (1− )-approximation (d̂1, . . . , d̂k) to PGZT . Then∑
k
vk(d̂k) ≥ (1− )
∑
k
vk(d˜k) ≥ (1− 3)OPT.
We give an explicit construction of the allocation (d˜1, . . . , d˜n) in Algorithm 2, thus completing the proof by
Lemma 5.8.
Lemma 5.8. Consider a feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ]. Then we can find a set
T ⊆ {d1, . . . , dn} and construct an allocation d˜ = (d˜1, . . . , d˜n), such that |T | ≤ 1 and d˜ is a feasible
solution to PGZT and v(d˜) ≥ (1− 2)v(d).
Proof. In Algorithm 2, let ¯`and T¯` be the values of ` and T` at the end of the repeat-until loop (line 8).
The basic idea of Algorithm 2 is that we first construct a nested sequence of sets of demands T0 ⊂
T1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ T¯`, such that a demand is included in each iteration if it has either a large real component or a
large imaginary component. The iteration proceeds until a sufficiently large number of demands have been
summed up (namely, |T¯`| ≥ 1 ), or no demands with large components remain. At the end of the iteration, if
the condition in line 10 holds, then S = T`, i.e., the whole set S can be packed within the polygonized region
PT¯`(). Otherwise, we find a subset of S that is feasible to PGZT¯`.
To do so, we partition S\T¯` into groups (possibly one group), each having a large component along either
the real or the imaginary axes, with respect to the boundaries of the region RT¯`. Then removing the group
with smallest value among these, or removing one of the large demands with smallest valuation will ensure
that remaining demands have a large value and can be packed within PT¯`().
We then have to consider two cases (line 13): (i) |T¯`| becomes at least 1 , or (ii) SR¯` ∪SI¯` = ∅. For case (i),
We reduce the size of T¯` by taking the first 1 demands, and then we combine the remaining demands in S\T¯`
into a group V1. We show next that removing any one demand dk ∈ T¯` will make S\{dk} a feasible solution
to PGZT¯`\{dk}. Since dT`  dT`′ for ` > `′, the lengthswRT` andwIT` are monotone decreasing for ` = 1, 2, . . .
Indeed, w.l.o.g., let ` be such that dk ∈ SR` (also dk 6∈ T`) and let T = T¯`\{dk}. Then, wRT ≤ wRT` implies
that
C
2ρ1(T )
≤ C
2ρ1(T`)
≤ w
R
T`
4
< dRk .
Hence, dRk is larger than the width of the grid’s cell
C
2ρ1(T )
. Therefore, dS\{dk} is a feasible solution to PGZT
because the removed demand exceeds the width of the grid (see Fig. 6 for an illustration).
For case (ii), we can apply Lemma 5.9 below to partition S\T¯` into at least 1 − 1 groups {V1, . . . , Vh},
where each group Vj has a large total component along either the real or the imaginary axes (precisely, greater
than 4w
R
T¯` or

4w
I
T¯` respectively). This implies that removing any group Vj will make T¯`∪
⋃
j′ 6=j Vj′ a feasible
solution to PGZT¯`.
15
Figure 6: dRk is larger then the grid’s width. If dk is removed, the remaining set of demands is feasible to
PGZT .
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 7: Demands {dk | T ∈ N\T} are partitioned into {Vi}.
To conclude, there are either (i) at least 1 demands in |T¯`|, or (ii) SR¯` ∪ SI¯` = ∅. We define S′ by deleting
a minimum valuation demand or group of demands from S (lines 23 and 26). Then, we set d˜k = dk if k ∈ S′
and d˜k = 0 if k 6∈ S′. Hence, in case (i), v(d˜) ≥ (1 − )OPT, and in case (ii), v(d˜) ≥ (1 − 1h)OPT ≥
1−2
1− · OPT ≥ (1− 2)OPT.
Lemma 5.9. Consider a set of demands S ⊆ D and T ⊆ S, such that
1. S is feasible solution to MULTICKP[0, pi2 ], but S is not a feasible solution to PGZT
2. dR ≤ 4wRT and dI ≤ 4wIT , for all d ∈ S\T .
Then there exists a partition {V1, . . . , Vh} of S\T such that
1. either (i)
∑
d∈Vj d
R ≥ 4wRT for all j = 1, . . . , h,
2. or (ii)
∑
d∈Vj d
I ≥ 4wIT for all j = 1, . . . , h.
where h ∈ [1 − 1, 4 ).
Proof. First, we define κ ,
∑
d∈S\T d. If S is a feasible solution to MULTICKP[0,
pi
2 ], but S is not a feasible
solution to PGZT , then at least one of the following two conditions must hold: either (i) κR ≥ w
R
T
2 or (ii)
κI ≥ wIT2 (see Fig. 7 for an illustration).
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Algorithm 2 CONSTRUCT({vk}k∈N ,d, C, )
Require: Users’ valuations {vk}k∈N ; a feasible allocation d = (d1, ..., dn); capacity C;
accuracy parameter 
Ensure: A set of demands T ⊆ {d1, . . . , dn} and a feasible allocation d˜
Initialize: S ← {d1, . . . , dn}; d˜ = d; `← 0; T` ← ∅; η` ← 0
. Find a subset of large demands T`
1: repeat
2: `← `+ 1
3: dT` ←
∑
d∈T`−1 d
4: wIT` ←
√
C2 − Re(dT`)2 − Im(dT`); wRT` ←
√
C2 − Im(dT`)2 − Re(dT`)
5: SR` ← {d ∈ S \ T` | dR > 4wRT`}; SI` ← {d ∈ S \ T` | dI > 4wIT`}
6: T` ← T` ∪ SR` ∪ SI`
7: η` ← η`−1 +
∑
d∈SR` ∪SI` d
8: until |T`| ≥ 1 or SR` ∪ SI` = ∅ or S\T` = ∅
9: κ←∑d∈S\T` d
10: if S\T` = ∅ or η` + κ ∈ PT`() then
11: return (T`,d)
12: else
. Find a subset S′ ⊂ S that is feasible to PGZT`
13: if |T`| ≥ 1 then
14: T` ← the set of the first 1 elements added to T`
15: h← 1; V1 ← S\T`
16: else
17: Find a partition V1, . . . , Vh over S\T` such that either
(i)
∑
d∈Vj d
R ≥ 4wRT` for all j = 1, . . . , h, or
(ii)
∑
d∈Vj d
I ≥ 4wIT` for all j = 1, . . . , h,
where h is defined in Lemma 5.9
18: end if
19: Pick k̂ ∈ argmin{vk(dk) | dk ∈ T`}
20: Pick ĵ ∈ argmin{∑k:dk∈Vj vk(dk) | j = 1, . . . , h}
21: if v
k̂
(d
k̂
) <
∑
k:dk∈Vĵ vk(dk) then
22: d˜
k̂
← 0
23: return (T`\{dk̂}, d˜)
24: else
25: d˜k ← 0 for all k : dk ∈ Vĵ
26: return (T`, d˜)
27: end if
28: end if
Without loss of generality, we assume case (i). Let us pack consecutive demands d ∈ S\T into batches
such that the sum in each batch has a real component of length in ( 4w
R
T ,

2w
R
T ]. More precisely, we fix an
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order on S\T = {d1, . . . , dr}, and find indices 1 = k1 < k2 < · · · < kh′ < kh′+1 = r + 1 such that
k`+1−1∑
k=k`
dRk ≤

2
wRT , for l = 1, . . . , h
′ (21)
and
k`+1∑
k=k`
dRk >

2
wRT for l = 1, . . . , h
′ − 1. (22)
It follows from Eqn. (22) that
∑k`+1−1
k=k`
dRk >

4w
R
T for l = 1, . . . , h
′ − 1, since dRk`+1 ≤ 4wRT . It also follows
that 1 ≤ h′ < 4 + 1, since summing Eqn. (21) for ` = 1, . . . , h′ yields

2
h′wRT ≥
h′∑
`=1
k`+1−1∑
k=k`
dRk =
r∑
k=1
dRk = κ
R ≥ w
R
T
2
. (23)
The last inequality follows from our assumption.
Similarly, summing Eqn. (22) for ` = 1, . . . , h′ − 1 yields
(h′ − 1) 
2
wRT <
h′−1∑
`=1
k`+1∑
k=k`
dRk ≤ 2
r∑
k=1
dRk = 2κ
R ≤ 2wRT ,
where the last inequality is derived by the feasibility of S. Setting V` , {dk` , dk`+1, . . . , dk`+1−1}, for ` =
1, . . . , h′ − 2, Vh′−1 = {dkh′−1 , . . . , dr}, and h , h′ − 1 satisfies the claim of the Lemma.
5.3 Making the PTAS Truthful
In this section, we make the PTAS, presented in Sec. 5.2, truthful. One technical difficulty that arises in this
case is that the polygons PT () defined by a guessed initial sets T are not monotone w.r.t. the set of demands
in T , that is, if we obtain T ′ from T by increasing one of the demands from dk to d′k  dk, then it could
be the case that PT () 6⊇ PT ′(). Hence, it is possible to manipulate the algorithm by a selfish user in T
who untruthfully increases his demand to change his allocation to become a winner. To handle this issue,
we will show that the number of possible polygons that arise from such a selfish user, misreporting his true
demand set, and can possibly change the outcome, is only a constant in  and δ (recall that we consider
MULTICKP[0, pi2 −δ]). Thus, it would be enough to consider only all such polygons arising from the reported
demand set. Figure 8 provides a pictorial illustration.
Since we assume that arg(d) ∈ [0, pi2 − δ], for all d ∈
⋃
kDk, we may assume further by performing a
rotation that any such vector d satisfies arg(d) ∈ [ δ2 , pi2 − δ2 ]. For convenience, we continue to denote the new
demand sets by Dk, and redefine the valuation functions in terms of these rotated sets. By this assumption,
tan
δ
2
≤ d
I
T
dRT
≤
(
tan
δ
2
)−1
, for any T ⊆ D. (24)
We may also assume, by scaling  by 2/(1 + 2 cot2 δ2) if necessary, that
 ≤ 2
1 + 2 cot2 δ2
. (25)
Now we state an important lemma that will be used to prove our main result.
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Figure 8: We consider two polygonized regionsRT andRT ′ , one defined by dT and the other by dT ′ (which is
obtained by slightly increasing one demand in T ). The figure illustrates the case that such a slight increase can
possibly change the granularity of the grid such that an infeasible solution in PT () would become feasible in
PT ′().
Lemma 5.10. Let T, T ′ ⊆ D be such that dT  dT ′ . Consider a vector κ ∈ C such that dT ′ + κ ∈ PT ′().
Then either (i) dT + κ ∈ PT (), or (ii) ρ1(T ′) ≤ ρ1(T ) + 1 and ρ2(T ′) ≤ ρ2(T ) + 1.
Proof. Suppose that dT + κ 6∈ PT (). Since dT ′  dT , it also holds that dT ′ + κ 6∈ PT (). This implies
that both dT + κ and dT ′ + κ lie within the same grid cell at vertical and horizontal levels ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ),
respectively, because otherwise |dT + κ+ ( C2ρ1(T ) + i C2ρ2(T ) )| > C and dT + κ+ ( C2ρ1(T ) + i C2ρ2(T ) ) 6∈ PT ′()
which is a contradiction. Hence dRT ′ − dRT ≤ C2ρ1(T ) ≤
wRT
4 and d
I
T ′ − dIT ≤ C2ρ2(T ) ≤
wIT
4 .
From the definition (16) of wRT , we have
(wRT + d
R
T )
2 = C2 − (dIT )2 and (wRT ′ + dRT ′)2 = C2 − (dIT ′)2
Subtracting the above equations from each other obtains
(wRT + d
R
T )
2 − (wRT ′ + dRT ′)2 = (dIT ′)2 − (dIT )2
⇒(wRT + dRT − wRT ′ − dRT ′)(wRT + dRT + wRT ′ + dRT ′) = (dIT ′ − dIT )(dIT ′ + dIT )
⇒wRT + dRT − wRT ′ − dRT ′ = (dIT ′ − dIT )
(
dIT ′ + d
I
T
wRT + d
R
T + w
R
T ′ + d
R
T ′
)
(26)
Therefore,
wRT = w
R
T ′ + d
R
T ′ − dRT + (wRT + dRT − wRT ′ − dRT ′)
= wRT ′ + d
R
T ′ − dRT +
(
dIT ′ − dIT
)( dIT ′ + dIT
dRT ′ + w
R
T ′ + d
R
T + w
R
T
)
(27)
≤ wRT ′ +
wRT
4
+
wIT
4
(
dIT ′ + d
I
T
dRT ′ + d
R
T
)
≤ wRT ′ +
wRT
4
(
1 +
wIT
wRT
· 1
tan δ2
)
, (28)
where we use Eqn. (26) in Eqn. (27), and use Eqn. (24) in the last inequality. We can upper-bound wIT /w
R
T
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by 2/ tan δ2 also using (24) as follows:
wIT
wRT
=
√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
− dITC√
1−
(
dIT
C
)2
− dRTC
=
√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
− dITC√
1−
(
dIT
C
)2
− dRTC
·
(√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
+
dIT
C
)(√
1−
(
dIT
C
)2
+
dRT
C
)
(√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
+
dIT
C
)(√
1−
(
dIT
C
)2
+
dRT
C
)
=
√
1−
(
dIT
C
)2
+
dRT
C√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
+
dIT
C
≤ 1 +
dRT
C√
1−
(
dRT
C
)2
+
dRT
C tan
δ
2
The latter quantity is bounded by f(1) = 2
tan
δ
2
, since the function f(a) , 1+a√
1−a2+a tan δ
2
is monotone
increasing in a ∈ [0, 1]. Using this bound in (27) and rearranging terms, we get
wRT ′ ≥ wRT
(
1− 
4
(1 + 2 cot2
δ
2
)
)
≥ 1
2
wRT , (29)
by our assumption (25) on . From (29) and
wR
T ′
8 <
C
2ρ1(T
′) , and
C
2ρ1(T )
≤ wRT4 , follows that ρ1(T ′) ≤
ρ1(T ) + 1. Similarly, we have ρ2(T ′) ≤ ρ2(T ) + 1.
We now state our main result for this section.
Theorem 5.11. For any , δ > 0 there is a (1−3)-socially efficient truthful mechanism for MULTICKP[0, pi2−
δ]. The running time is |⋃kDk|O
(
cot2 δ2
2
)
.
Proof. It suffices to define a declaration-independent range S of feasible allocations, such that maxd∈S v(d) ≥
(1− 3) · OPT, and we can optimize over S in the stated time.
For T ⊆ D, let G(T ) be the set of vectors in C defined by the union of {dT } and
(a) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z ∈ RT , such that z = `1 ∩ `2 for some `1 ∈ L1(ρ1(T ) + 1)
and `2 ∈ L2(ρ2(T ) + 1), and either ρ1({z}) = ρ1(T ) + 1 or ρ2({z}) = ρ2(T ) + 1, but not both; and
(b) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z ∈ RT , such that z = `1 ∩ `2 for some `1 ∈ L1(ρ1(T ) + 1)
and `2 ∈ L2(ρ2(T ) + 1), and ρ1({z}) = ρ1(T ) + 1 and ρ2({z}) = ρ2(T ) + 1.
Note that |G(T )| = O(1 ). We mention that it is possible to enumerate over allL1(ρ1(T )+1)∩L2(ρ2(T )+
1) points ( i.e., the intersection points of the dotted grid lines in Figure 9), instead we choose to only enumerate
over a smaller subset of Pareto minimal points that are defined by (a) and (b). Figure 9 gives a pictorial
example of these minimal points.
For convenience of notation, let us fix two subsets D1,D2 ⊆ D. For z ∈ G(T ), let us denote by Sz(D2)
the range of feasible allocations defined as in (15) with respect to the MULTI-mDKP problem with constraints
(18)-(20), when
(I) T is replaced by T ∪ {z − dT } (and hence, z is used to define the polygon PT ());
(II) we add an additional “dummy” user n + 1 to N with valuation vn+1(d) = 0 for all d ∈ D, such that
the vector z − dT as allocated to this user; and
(III) the set of vectors in N\N is chosen from D2.
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Figure 9: The figure illustrates the points of the setG(T ). The black solid lines are L1(ρ1(T )) and L2(ρ2(T ))
on the vertical and horizontal directions respectively; the gray dotted lines (with some overlapping with the
black lines) correspond to L1(ρ1(T ) + 1) and L2(ρ2(T ) + 1). The red square points correspond to condition
(a), and the blue diamond points correspond to condition (b).
Then we define the range S(D1,D2) as the union:
S(D1,D2) ,
⋃
T⊆D1: |T |≤ 1
 ⋃
z∈G(T )
Sz(D2)
 .
By Lemmas 5.1 and 5.8, we have maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) ≥ (1− 3)OPT (since dT ∈ G(T )). It remains to argue
that we can efficiently optimize over S(D,D). Using Lemma 5.10, we argue that we can solve the optimiza-
tion problem over S(D,D) assuming thatD = ⋃kDk, that is, maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) = maxd∈S(⋃kDk,⋃kDk) v(d).
One direction “≥” is obvious; so let us show that maxd∈S(D,D) v(d) ≤ maxd∈S(⋃kDk,⋃kDk) v(d).
Suppose that d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d∗n) is an optimal allocation over S(D,D), but such that d∗ ∈ Sz′ for some
z′ ∈ G(T ′′), T ′′ ⊆ D, and T ′′ 6⊆ ⋃kDk. Then let us show that there is a set T ⊆ ⋃kDk, z ∈ G(T ), and
d˜ ∈ Sz(D), such that v(d˜) = v(d∗).
Define an allocation d˜ as follows: Let N = {k : d∗k ∈ T ′′}; for each k ∈ N , we choose d˜k ∈ Dk such
that d˜k  d∗k and vk(d˜k) = vk(d∗k), and we keep d˜k = d∗k if k 6∈ N . Let us apply the statement of the lemma
with T = {d˜k : k ∈ N}, T ′ = T ′′∪{z′−dT ′′}, and κ =
∑
k:k 6∈N∪{n+1} d
∗
k. If (i) holds then dT +κ ∈ PT ()
and therefore we have
max
d∈S(D,D)
v(d) = max
d∈S(⋃kDk,D) v(d). (30)
On the other hand, if (ii) holds, then ρ1(T ′) ∈ {ρ1(T ), ρ1(T ) + 1} and ρ2(T ′) ∈ {ρ2(T ), ρ2(T ) + 1}. In this
case, if ρ1(T ′) = ρ1(T ) and ρ2(T ′) = ρ2(T ) then PT ′() ⊆ PT () (since dT  dT ′), in contradiction that
(i) does not hold; otherwise, there is a point z ∈ G(T ) such that z  z′, ρ1(T ∪ {z − dT }) = ρ1(T ′) and
ρ2(T ∪ {z − dT }) = ρ2(T ′). Then z + κ  z′ + κ ∈ PT ′() ⊆ PT∪{z−dT }(), and we get again (30).
Finally, we note that
max
d∈S(⋃kDk,D) v(d) = maxd∈S(⋃kDk,⋃kDk) v(d),
as follows from (the proof of) Lemma 5.2.
21
6 A Truthful (1, 1 + )-FPTAS for MULTICKP[0, pi − δ]
In this section, we present our truthful (1, 1 + )-approximation for MULTICKP[0, pi − δ] by a reduction to
MULTI-2DKP. As in [18], the basic idea is to round off the set of possible demands to obtain a range, by
which we can optimize over in polynomial time using dynamic programming (to obtain an MIR).
Let θ = max{φ − pi2 , 0}, where φ , maxd∈D arg(d). We assume that tan θ is bounded by an a-priori
known polynomialP (n) ≥ 1 in n, that is independent of the customers declarations (valuations and demands),
because the power factors are often limited by certain regulations in practice.
Let N+ , {k ∈ N | dR ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ Dk} and N− , {k ∈ N | dR < 0 ∀d ∈ Dk} be the subsets of users
with demand sets in the first and second quadrants respectively (recall that we restrict users’ declarations to
allow such a partition).
We can upper bound the total projections for any feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) of demands as
follows: ∑
k∈N
dIk ≤ C,
∑
k∈N−(d)
−dRk ≤ C tan θ,
∑
k∈N+(d)
dRk ≤ C(1 + tan θ), (31)
where N+(d) , {k ∈ N | dRk ≥ 0} ⊆ N+ and N−(d) , {k ∈ N | dRk < 0} ⊆ N−. Define L , Cn(P (n)+1) ,
and for d ∈ D, define the new rounded demand d̂ as follows:
d̂ = d̂R + id̂I ,

⌈
dR
L
⌉
· L+ i
⌈
dI
L
⌉
· L, if dR ≥ 0,⌊
dR
L
⌋
· L+ i
⌈
dI
L
⌉
· L, otherwise.
(32)
For convenience, we will write d̂ = (d̂1, . . . , d̂n). Note that by this definition, N+(d) = N+(d̂) and
N−(d) = N−(d̂).
Consider an optimal allocation d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d∗n) to MULTICKP [0, pi − δ]. Let ξ+ (and ξ−), ζ+ (and
ζ−) be the respective real and imaginary absolute total projections of the rounded demands in N+(d∗) (and
N−(d∗)). Then the possible values of ξ+, ξ−, ζ+, ζ− are integral mutiples of L in the following ranges:
ξ+ ∈ A+ ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C(1 + P (n))
L
⌉
· L
}
,
ξ− ∈ A− ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C · P (n)
L
⌉
· L
}
,
ζ+, ζ− ∈ B ,
{
0, L, 2L, . . . ,
⌈
C
L
⌉
· L
}
.
We first present a (1, 1 + 4)-approximation algorithm (MULTICKP-FPTAS) for MULTICKP[0, pi − δ];
then we show how to implement it as an MIR mechanism.
The basic idea of Algorithm MULTICKP-FPTAS is to enumerate the guessed total projections on real and
imaginary axes for N+(d∗) and N−(d∗) respectively. We then solve two separate MULTI-2DKP problems
(one for each quadrant) to find subsets of demands that satisfy the individual guessed total projections. But
since MULTI-2DKP is generally NP-hard, we need first to round the demands to get a problem that can be
solved efficiently by dynamic programming. We note that the violation of the optimal solution to the rounded
problem w.r.t. the original problem is small in .
For any allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Dn, let us for brevity write τ+(d) ,
∑
k∈N+(d) d
R
k , τ−(d) ,∑
k∈N−(d)−dRk , and τI(d) ,
∑
k∈N d
I
k. Then by (32) and the fact that x ≤ tdxt e ≤ x + t for any x, t such
that t > 0, we have
max{τ(d̂)− nL, 0} ≤ τ(d) ≤ τ(d̂), (33)
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for all τ ∈ {τ+, τ−, τI}.
Lemma 6.1. For any feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) to MULTICKP [0, pi − δ], we have
∣∣∑
k d̂k
∣∣ ≤
(1 + 2)C.
Proof. Using (33) and (31),(∑
k∈N
d̂Rk
)2
+
(∑
k∈N
d̂Ik
)2
=
(
τ+(d̂)− τ−(d̂)
)2
+ τ2I (d̂)
= τ2+(d̂) + τ
2
−(d̂)− 2τ+(d̂)τ−(d̂) + τ2I (d̂)
≤ (τ+(d) + nL)2 + (τ−(d) + nL)2 − 2τ+(d)τ−(d) + (τI(d) + nL)2
= (τ+(d)− τ−(d))2 + τ2I (d) + 2nL(τ+(d) + τ−(d) + τI(d)) + 3n2L2
=
(∑
k∈N
dRk
)2
+
(∑
k∈N
dIk
)2
+ 2nL
(∑
k∈N
|dRk |+
∑
k∈N
dIk
)
+ 3n2L2
≤ C2 + 4nL(P (n) + 1)C + 3n2L2 = C2 + 4C2 + 32C2/(1 + P (n))2
≤ C2(1 + 4+ 32) ≤ C2(1 + 2)2.
The next step is to solve the rounded instances exactly. This can be done with essentially the same
dynamic program used in the proof of Lemma 5.2, modulo a small modification, which we include here for
completeness.
For d ∈ D, we use d¯ to denote the vector in C with components d¯R = −dR and d¯I = dI. We define a
(new) valuation function v¯k by: v¯k(d) = vk(d), for k ∈ N+, and v¯k(d) = vk(d¯), for k ∈ N−. Let further
D̂ , { dL ∈ D : dR ∈ A+ and dI ∈ B}, and note that |D̂| = O(n
2P 3(n)
2
).
Assume an arbitrary order on N = {1, ..., n}. We define a 3D table, with each entry U(k, c) being the
maximum value obtained from a subset of users {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆ N , each choosing a demand from D̂, such
that the chosen demands fit exactly within capacity c ∈ D̂ (i.e., satisfy the capacity constraints as an equation
along each of the axes). The cells of the table are defined according to the following rules:
U(1, c) , v¯1(L · c);
U(k, c) , −∞ for all c 6∈ D̂;
U(k + 1, c) , max
c′∈D̂
{v¯k+1(L · c′) + U(k, c− c′)}.
The corresponding optimal allocation (F+ or F−) can be mapped to the original range of demands D as
follows:
I(1, c) , {(1, d1)} where d1 ∈ D1 is
s.t.
{
v1(d1) = v1(L · c) and d1  L · c, if 1 ∈ N+,
v1(d1) = v1(L · c¯) and d1  L · c¯, if 1 ∈ N−;
I(k + 1, c) , I(k, c) ∪ {(k + 1, dk+1)} where dk+1 ∈ Dk+1 is
s.t.
{
vk+1(dk+1) = vk+1(L · d) and dk+1  L · d, if k + 1 ∈ N+,
vk+1(dk+1) = vk+1(L · d¯) and dk+1  L · d¯, if k + 1 ∈ N−,
where d ∈ argmax
c′∈D̂{v¯k+1(L · c′) + U(k, c− c′)}.
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Algorithm 3 MULTICKP-FPTAS ({vk, Dk}k∈N , C, )
Require: Users’ multi-minded valuations {vk, Dk}k∈N ; capacity C; accuracy parameter 
Ensure: a (1, 1 + 4)-approximation d = (d1, . . . , dn) to MULTICKP[0, pi − δ]
1: (d1, . . . , dn)← (0, . . . ,0)
2: D̂ ← { dL ∈ D : dR ∈ A+ and dI ∈ B}
3: for all ξ+ ∈ A+, ξ− ∈ A−, ζ+, ζ− ∈ B do
4: if (ξ+ − ξ−)2 + (ζ+ + ζ−)2 ≤ (1 + 2)2C2 then
5: F+ ← MULTI-2DKP-EXACT({vk, Dk}k∈N+ , ξ+L , ζ+L , D̂)
6: F− ← MULTI-2DKP-EXACT({v¯k, Dk}k∈N− , ξ−L , ζ−L , D̂)
7: (d′1, . . . , d′n)← F+ ∪ F−
8: if
∑
k vk(d
′
k) >
∑
k vk(dk) then
9: (d1, . . . , dn)← (d′1, . . . , d′n)
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: return (d1, . . . , dn)
This table can be filled-up by standard dynamic programming; we denote such a program by MULTI-2DKP-
EXACT[·].
The following lemma states that the allocation returned by MULTICKP-FPTAS does not violate the
capacity constraint by more than a factor of 1 + 4.
Lemma 6.2. Let d be the allocation returned by MULTICKP-FPTAS. Then |∑k dk| ≤ (1 + 4)C.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 6.1,(∑
k∈N
dRk
)2
+
(∑
k∈N
dIk
)2
= (τ+(d)− τ−(d))2 + τ2I (d)
= τ2+(d) + τ
2
−(d)− 2τ+(d)τ−(d) + τ2I (d). (34)
If both τ+(d̂) and τ−(d̂) are less than nL, then the R.H.S. of (34) can be bounded by
τ2+(d̂) + τ
2
−(d̂) + τ
2
I (d̂) ≤ τ2+(d̂) + τ2−(d̂)− 2τ+(d̂)τ−(d̂) + 2n2L2 + τ2I (d̂)
= (τ+(d̂)− τ−(d̂))2 + τ2I (d̂) + 2n2L2. (35)
Otherwise, we bound the R.H.S. of (34) by
τ2+(d̂) + τ
2−(d̂)− 2(τ+(d̂)− nL)(τ−(d̂)− nL) + τ2I (d̂)
= (τ+(d̂)− τ−(d̂))2 + τ2I (d̂) + 2nL(τ+(d̂) + τ−(d̂))− 2n2L2. (36)
Sinced = F+∪F− is obtained from feasible solutionsF+ andF− to 2DKP-EXACT({vk, Dk}k∈N+ , ξ+L , ζ+L , D̂)
and 2DKP-EXACT({v¯k, Dk}k∈N− , ξ−L , ζ−L , D̂), respectively, and ξ+, ξ−, ζ+, ζ− satisfy the condition in Step 4,
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it follows from (34)-(36) that(∑
k∈N
dRk
)2
+
(∑
k∈N
dIk
)2
≤
(∑
k∈N
d̂Rk
)2
+
(∑
k∈N
d̂Ik
)2
+ 2nL
∑
k∈N
|d̂Rk |+ 2n2L2
= (ξ+ − ξ−)2 + (ζ+ + ζ−)2 + 2nL(ξ+ + ξ−) + 2n2L2
≤
(
(1 + 2)2C2 + 4n
C
n(P (n) + 1)
(1 + P (n))C + 2n2
2C2
n2(P (n) + 1)2
)
≤ ((1 + 2)2 + 4+ 22)C2 ≤ (1 + 4)2C2.
Theorem 6.3. For any , δ > 0, there is a truthful mechanism for MULTICKP[0, pi − δ], that returns a
(1, 1 + 4)-approximation. The running time is polynomial in n, cot δ, and 1 .
Proof. We define a declaration-independent range S as follows. For ξ+ ∈ A+, ξ− ∈ A−, ζ+, ζ− ∈ B, define
Sξ+,ξ−,ζ+,ζ− , {d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D̂n :
∑
k∈N+
L · dRk = ξ+,
∑
k∈N+
L · dIk = ζ+,
−
∑
k∈N−
L · dRk = ξ−,
∑
k∈N−
L · dIk = ζ−}.
Define further
S ,
⋃
(ξ+−ξ−)2+(ζ++ζ−)2≤(1+2)2C2
Sξ+,ξ−,ζ+,ζ− .
Using Algorithm MULTICKP-FPTAS, we can optimize over S in time polynomial in n and 1 . Thus, it
remains only to argue that the algorithm returns a (1, 1 + 4)-approximation w.r.t. the original range Dn.
To see this, let d∗1, . . . , d∗n ∈ D be the demands allocated in an optimum solution to MULTICKP[0, pi − δ],
and d1, . . . , dn ∈ D be the demands allocated by MULTICKP-FPTAS. Then by Lemma 6.1, the truncated
optimal allocation (d̂∗1, . . . , d̂∗n) is feasible with respect to a capacity of (1 + 2)C, and thus its projections
will satisfy the condition in Step 4 of Algorithm 3. It follows that v(d) ≥ v(d̂∗) ≥ v(d∗) = OPT, where
the second inequality follows from the way we round demands (32) and the monotonicity of the valuations.
Finally, the fact that the solution returned byMULTICKP-FPTAS violates the capacity constraint by a factor
of at most (1 + 4) follows readily from Lemma 6.2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided truthful mechanisms for an important variant of the knapsack problem with
complex-valued demands. We gave a truthful PTAS when all demand sets of users lie in the positive quadrant
(which is attained by limited power factors), and a truthful FPTAS with capacity augmentation when some of
the demand sets can lie in the second quadrant (which captures the general setting of large power factors). Our
hardness results show that this is essentially best possible assuming P6=NP. Our fundamental results underpin
a wide class of resource allocation problems arising in smart grid. The complete understanding of truthful
complex-demand problem paves the way to more sophisticated and efficient mechanism design in future smart
grids. Recently, this work has been extended to consider scheduling problems [12, 13, 17].
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APPENDIX
A Proofs of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2
Lemma 5.1.
Proof. Consider an optimal allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn), and assume without loss of generality that v1(d1) ≥
. . . ≥ vn(dn), and (by the monotonicity of valuations) that
∑
k∈N dk = c. Let t , dm e, and N =
{1, 2, . . . , t}. Without loss of generality, suppose ci − ∑k∈N dik > 0 for all i and n > t. Then, there
exist k1, . . . , km ∈ N \ N such that, for all i ∈ [m], diki ≥
ci−∑k∈N dik
n−t . We define another allocation
d̂ = (d̂1, . . . , d̂n) ∈ Dn as follows: let d¯ = (dk : k ∈ N), and for i ∈ [m], set
d̂ik =

dik if k ∈ N,
0 if k = ki,⌈
dik
bi
N,d¯
⌉
· bi
N,d¯
if k 6∈ N and k 6= ki.
Note that ∑
k 6∈N
d̂ik ≤
∑
k 6∈N, k 6=ki
(dik + b
i
N,d¯) ≤
∑
k 6∈N
dik + (n− t)biN,d¯ − diki ≤ ci −
∑
k∈N
dik (37)
that is, d̂ is a feasible allocation. Let rik ,
⌈
dik
bi
N,d¯
⌉
for k ∈ N\(N ∪ {ki}) and rik , 0 for k = ki. Then it
follows using Eqn. (37) that
∑
k 6∈N r
i
k ≤ (n− t)2:∑
k 6∈N
rik ≤
∑
k 6∈N, k 6=ki
dik + b
i
N,d¯
bi
N,d¯
= (n− t)2
∑
k 6∈N, k 6=ki(d
i
k + b
i
N,d¯
)
ci −∑k∈N dik ≤ (n− t)2 (38)
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Thus d̂ ∈ S . Finally note that, for all i ∈ [m], vk(dki) ≤ 1t
∑
k∈N vk(dk), from which we get by the
monotonicity of the valuations that v(d̂) =
∑
k∈N vk(dk) +
∑
k 6∈N, k 6∈{k1,...,km} vk(d̂k) ≥
∑
k vk(dk) −∑m
i=1 vk(dki) ≥ (1− )OPT.
Lemma 5.2.
Proof. We first observe that, due to the way the valuations are defined in (6), we may assume for the purpose
of computing an optimal allocation d∗ that D = ⋃kDk. Indeed, suppose that d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d∗n) ∈ SN,d¯∗ ,
where d¯∗ = (d∗k : k ∈ N), d∗k′ 6∈ Dk′ for some k′ ∈ N , and d∗k = (rik · biN,d∗ : i ∈ [m]) for k 6∈ N .
Then let us define a new allocation d˜ as follows: for each k ∈ N , we choose d˜k ∈ Dk such that d˜k  d∗k and
vk(d˜k) = vk(d
∗
k); we set d¯ = (d˜k : k ∈ N), and for k 6∈ N , define d˜k = (rik · biN,d¯ : i ∈ [m]). Note by (14)
that bN,d¯ ≥ bN,d¯∗ , and hence v(d˜) ≥ v(d∗). We note furthermore that d˜ ∈ SN,d¯, since for all i, we have∑
k
(d˜ik − d∗,ik ) =
∑
k∈N
(d˜ik − d∗,ik ) +
∑
k′ 6∈N
rik′
(n− |N |)2
∑
k∈N
(d∗,ik − d˜ik)
=
∑
k∈N
(d˜ik − d∗,ik )
(
1−
∑
k′ 6∈N r
i
k′
(n− |N |)2
)
≤ 0,
since d˜ik ≤ d∗,ik and
∑
k′ 6∈N r
i
k′ ≤ (n − |N |)2, for all i. It follows that
∑
k d˜k ≤
∑
k dk
∗ ≤ c, and hence
d˜ ∈ SN,d¯ as claimed.
To maximize over S, with the restriction that D = ⋃kDk, we iterate over all subsets N ⊆ N of size at
most m and all partial selections d¯ = (dk ∈ Dk : k ∈ N). For each such choice (N, d¯), we use dynamic
programming to find argmaxd∈SN,d¯ v(d). Let bN,d¯ be as defined in (14). Without loss of generality, assume
N \N = {1, . . . , n − t}. For k ∈ N \N and r = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (n − |N |)2}m, define U(k, r)
to be the maximum value obtained from a subset of users {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆ N \ N , with user j ∈ [k] having
demand d̂ij = r
i
j · biN,d¯ for i ∈ [m], where rij ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (n − |N |)2}, and such that
∑
j∈[k] r
i
j ≤ ri.
For two vectors x, y ∈ Rm, let us denote by x ∗ y the vector with components (x1y1, . . . , xmym). Define
U(1, r) = −∞, if r 6≥ 0. Then we can use the following recurrence to compute U(k, r):
U(1, r) = max
r
v1(bN,d¯ ∗ r)
U(k + 1, r) = max
rk+1≤r
{
vk+1(bN,d¯ ∗ rk+1) + U(k, r − rk+1)
}
.
Note that the number of possible choices for r is at most n2m, and hence the total time required by the dynamic
program is nO(m). Finally, given the vector r that maximizes U(n − |N |, r), we can obtain (by tracing back
the optimal choices in the table) an optimal vector rk = (r1k, . . . , r
m
k ), for each k ∈ N \ N . From this, we
get an allocation d˜ ∈ S, by defining d˜k = dk for k ∈ N and, for k 6∈ N , we choose d˜k ∈ Dk such that
d˜k  rk ∗ bN,d¯ and vk(d˜k) = vk(rk ∗ bN,d¯).
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